Abstract: The introduction of distributed control systems and the high level of interconnectivity of modern process plants has caused alarm flooding to become one of the main problems in alarm management of process plants. A reduction of alarm flood periods contributes to a decrease in plant incidents. In this work, a combination of alarm log, process data and connectivity analysis is used to isolate consequence alarms originating from the same process abnormality and to provide a causal alarm suggestion. The effectiveness of the method is illustrated on an industrial case study of an ethylene plant, a typical example of a large-scale industrial system.
INTRODUCTION
Alarm systems are crucial elements in the operation of process plants as they continuously monitor the process and inform the operators if an undesired process state that requires their assessment or action is reached (IEC-62682, 2014 ).
The introduction of distributed control systems in the process industry has increased the number of alarms per operator exponentially (Hollifield and Habibi, 2011) . Additionally, nowadays, modern process plants present a high level of interconnectivity due to steam recirculation, heat integration and use of complex control systems. A disturbance affecting the process plant can therefore spread through its material, energy and information connections and affect all the process variables on the path. Alarms associated to these process variables are triggered and may overload the control room operators who will not be able to properly investigate each of these alarms (Wang et al., 2015) . This undesired situation known as alarm flood has been recognized as a major cause of most industrial incidents investigated by the US Chemical Safety Board (Beebe et al., 2007) . The ANSI/ISA-18.2 (2009) defines an alarm flood as the occurrence of more than 10 alarms per 10 minutes and per operator. In such situation, the operators might not be able to keep the process plant within safe operation endangering human lives and the environment (Bransby and Jenkinson, 1998) . Henningsen and Kemmerer (1995) pointed out that in a typical alarm log, a significant part of nuisance alarms fall in the following categories: repetitive alarms, standing alarms and consequence alarms. For removing repetitive and standing alarms methods such as the use of filtering, time-delay, dead-band and difference functions are proposed. These techniques succeed in lowering the number of alarms when the process is running under nominal conditions. Nevertheless if an abnormality occurs and propagates through the plant, these methods are unable to suppress consequence alarms and to provide a proper diagnosis. This task demands to identify all causal relations between alarms (Hollender and Beuthel, 2007) .
Recently, several contributions from academia and industry proposed systematic methods for the grouping of consequence alarms. Event correlation is applied in Higuchi et al. (2009) and Yang et al. (2012) for this purpose. On the other hand, noticing that a large portion of the alarms occurring in an alarm flood are related to each other and follow a specific pattern, Kabir et al. (2013) and Cheng et al. (2013) suggest using sequence pattern matching for grouping consequence alarms. Kabir et al. (2013) presented a method in which the similarity between alarm flood sequences is determined under the assumption that alarms occur in a consequential manner. This assumption, may however not always be true as the order of occurrence of alarms is highly dependent on their limit setting. Postulating that the exact order of alarm occurrences is not as important as their proximity in time, Cheng et al. (2013) proposed an alternative method for pattern matching of alarm flood sequences based on the Smith-Waterman algorithm. Time stamps of the alarms present in the alarm flood sequence are used to blur the order of the alarm sequence when the alarm time stamps are considered close to each other. Lai and Chen (2015) proposed an extension of this algorithm to the case of aligning multiple alarm flood sequences.
In Schleburg et al. (2013) , the authors suggest a method to group consequence alarms based on both a topology model describing the process connectivity and a set of rules built using process knowledge. In this method, every pair of alarms is checked against the set of rules and the plant connectivity to evaluate if two alarms are related. pointing them to the causal alarm (i.e. the alarm related to the root-cause of the alarm flood) could significantly reduce their reaction time.
Causal root-cause analysis for process troubleshooting is the topic of several recent contributions investigating the design of systematic methods for abnormality propagation paths determination and plant-wide disturbances causal analysis. Quantitative data-driven methods detecting directionality between measurements have emerged, such as time delay analysis (Fan and Deyun, 2012) or transfer entropy, which is used to identify the causality between measurements even in absence of observable time delays between them (Bauer et al., 2007) . A combination of quantitative process history methods and qualitative models like Signed direct graphs (SDG) (Fan and Deyun, 2012) are proposed in Thambirajah et al. (2009) .
The present work follows the line of thought in Schleburg et al. (2013) but aims at developing a systematic method for the isolation of the causal alarm in an alarm flood. The proposed approach relies on the use of multiple process information sources: alarm logs, historical process data and a topology model of the process. Even though the data originating from different information sources differ in their nature, they are related to each other.
By combining alarm log, process data and conectivity analysis not only related alarms of an alarm flood can be grouped, but also their causal alarm can be identified.
CAUSAL ANALYSIS FOR ALARM FLOOD REDUCTION
This section describes an approach for alarm flood reduction and causal alarm determination.
The proposed approach relies on two assumptions:
(1) Alarm floods are the result of an abnormality propagating in the process through material, energy and information connections. (2) If two alarm flood sequences are similar, then they stem from the same process abnormality.
Regarding the first hypothesis, the aim of this work is to reduce alarm floods caused by a disturbance spreading through the plant due to its high level of interconnectivity. As for the second hypothesis, if two alarm flood sequences share a common pattern and if a large portion of the alarm occurrences in the alarm floods are present in this pattern, it is very likely that they originate from the same process abnormality.
The method consists of five steps. In the first step, chattering alarms are removed from the alarm log. In the second step, time intervals containing alam floods are identified and alarm flood sequences are built. Similar alarm flood sequences are clustered in the third step. In the fourth step, the signals and assets associated with the analyzed alarms are identified. In the last step, process data causal analysis followed by connectivity validation are performed in order to suggest a causal alarm. The method's general workflow is depicted in Fig. 1 .
In the present work it is assumed that an alarm sequence is defined as follows: 
where e m is the alarm type, particularly a tag contained in the alphabet of alarm types Σ, and t m its time stamp.
Remove chattering alarms
Chattering alarms are defined by the industrial standard ANSI/ISA-18.2 (2009) as "alarms that repeatedly transition between the alarm state and the normal state in a short period of time". Since the present work focuses on analyzing consequence alarms, chattering alarms are removed prior to the causal analysis.
Following Kabir et al. (2013) , in order to remove chattering alarms, a minimal admissible time interval length is chosen and if the time elapsed between the occurrences of two alarms of the same type is lower than the chosen interval, the second alarm is removed. The minimal admissible time interval length in the present work is taken as 10 min, based on the definition of alarm flood.
Identify alarm flood periods
This step isolates time periods where alarm floods occur and builds the corresponding alarm flood sequences.
The alarm log is divided into time intervals of 10 min. Intervals with more alarm occurrences than a specified threshold are highlighted. The threshold (τ ) is chosen based on the definition of an alarm flood, i.e. more than 10 alarms per 10 min and per operator.
Duration of alarm floods in process plants ranges from a few minutes to several hours. In order to identify an alarm flood regardless of its duration, consecutive intervals with more alarm occurrences than the specified threshold are merged. Since the alarm log is discretized, it might happen IFAC DYCOPS-CAB, 2016 June 6-8, 2016 . NTNU, Trondheim, Norway that the beginning or the end of an alarm flood sequence is cut out, in order not to lose part of the sequence, the time intervals before and after the consecutive time intervals containing more than τ alarms are also included.
Cluster alarm flood sequences
Once the alarm flood time intervals are isolated and the alarm flood sequences are built, similar alarm flood sequences are clustered using sequence pattern matching.
Alarm time stamps are taken into account as the proximity in time of the alarms is more important than the exact order of occurrence. We use the method described in Cheng et al. (2013) based on a modified Smith-Waterman (MSW) algorithm to blur the order of the alarms in the sequence when they occur closely in time. A similarity matrix is built using pairwise similarity indices obtained from the MSW algorithm. Finally, agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC) with the average linkage criterion is applied to cluster the alarm flood sequences.
One main disadvantage of the MSW algorithm is its heavy computational burden. In order to overcome this problem a prefiltering stage is added. A less precise but less time consuming method is used (Kabir et al., 2013) .
Combinations of alarm sequences with low similarity are filtered out and the MSW index computation is applied to a subset of alarm sequence combinations with a significant similarity. A pair of alarm sequences is considered similar if the two alarm sequences have a high ratio of alarms in common. If two alarm sequences have few alarms in common, the computation of the MSW similarity index is discarded. A zero similarity index will be assumed.
Two thresholds are used: the prefilter threshold (λ pref ) and the clustering threshold (λ clus ). The first threshold decides whether a pair of alarm sequences is filtered out. The second threshold sets the stopping criteria of the clustering algorithm. The values of these two thresholds are interrelated: for a given clustering threshold, setting the prefilter threshold too high can lead to combinations of alarm sequences with MSW similarity index large enough for being clustered, but with a prefilter similarity index too low to pass the prefilter. A solution to facilitate the thresholds' choice is to make the prefilter and the MSW similarity indices comparable. If one could insure that SI pref ilter ≥ SI M SW , for a given clustering threshold if the prefilter threshold is set to be equal or smaller than the clustering threshold, all pairs of alarms that have a MSW similarity index high enough to be clustered together will pass the prefilter.
Given two alarm sequences A and B, a similarity index that meet this requirement is:
The numerator represents the number of common alarm occurrences in both sequences. And the denominator is the number of alarm occurrences of the longest sequence (the similarity index is normalized between 0 and 1).
According to assumption (2) in Section 2, sequences belonging to the same cluster stem from the same process abnormality. Therefore, an alarm template can be built for each cluster/process abnormality. This alarm template contains the representative alarms that identify the corresponding process abnormality (Bouchair et al., 2013 ), see Fig. 1 . Alarms that are not related to a process abnormality can trigger during the same time interval. Obviously, these alarms should not be included in the abnormality template. Filtering out these alarms is achieved based on their frequency of occurrence in the training set of alarm floods. The threshold on frequency of occurrence is set to 50%, i.e. an alarm is kept only if it occurs in more than 50% of the sequences belonging to a given cluster. The third step of the proposed method where alarm flood sequences are clustered and a set of templates defining the process abnormalities of all clusters is generated is summarized in Fig. 2 and described in Alg. 1.
Set of alarm flood sequences

Alg. 1: Cluster alarm flood sequences
input : Alarm flood sequences {A i } : i = 1, 2, ..., N output:
0, otherwise
3 {C k } = AHC(S, λ clus ) 4 For each C k if (alarm type e ∈ Σ is present in more than 50% of A i ∈ C k ) add e to T k
Map alarms to signals and assets
The absence of a common naming convention for alarm, signal and assets tags hinders a straightforward mapping between the different process information sources. We propose to map alarms, signals and assets based on the similarity of the symbols contained in their tag names. For instance, the tag name of a temperature controller from the case study is TC11 in the P&ID, this controller has a signal associated whose tag is TC11CO.XAY and an alarm type TC11CO is assigned to this signal.
In this work six hashmaps {M ap x→y : x = y, x, y = e, si, as} mapping alarm types (e), signals (si) and assets (as) are generated based on the computation of a similarity index as described in Alg. 2. Particularly, the similarity index (SI SW ) obtained from the original Smith Waterman algorithm (Smith and Waterman, 1981 
Isolate the causal alarm
The first alarm with respect to the time of occurrence cannot be considered as the causal alarm since the time at which an alarm triggers is highly dependent on the settings of the alarm limits. Moreover, the time between the occurrence of a process abnormality and the corresponding alarm triggering is probabilistic. As the causal relationships between signals can be captured, the process data associated to these alarms should be analyzed instead.
The method used for this purpose is transfer entropy (Bauer et al., 2007) . Transfer entropy uses transition probabilities to estimate the amount of information transferred from one signal x to another signal y and reads:
The causality is obtained by comparing the amount of information transferred from signal x to signal y with the amount information transferred from signal y to signal x. If t x→y is positive, more information is transferred from x to y, and therefore x caused y. If t x→y is negative, y caused x. If it has a value close to 0, then the causality cannot be deduced.
This method may give rise to spurious results (Bauer et al., 2007) . In order to reduce their number, the obtained results are validated against the plant connectivity information contained in the topology model of the plant (Thambirajah et al., 2009) . CAEX (Computer Aided Engineering eXchange) is a vendor independent objectoriented data exchange format based on the XML schema that has been used in the past years for structuring plant topology models in a flexible and expandable way (see e.g.: Schleburg et al., 2013) .
The topology based validation of the data-driven analysis starts with the identification of the assets corresponding to the alarms in the fault template. The connectivity of the plant is explored using a graph-search algorithm on a graph capturing the connections between assets in the plant. The depth first search algorithm is employed in this work (Yang et al., 2010) . The assets suggested as root-causes from the data-driven analysis are taken as starting points of the disturbance propagation path while the remaining assets are taken as secondary disturbed elements. All feasible propagation paths between the suggested root-cause and each of the secondary disturbed assets are explored. If no feasible path is found, the rootcause hypothesis is discarded.
Once the spurious results of the data-driven analysis have been filtered out and one of the root-cause suggestions has been validated with plant connectivity, the causal alarm is taken as the alarm associated to the root-cause asset (see Alg. 3).
Alg. 3: Isolate the causal alarm input : Clusters {C k } and fault templates {T k } output: A causal alarm a k c for each fautl template T k 1 For each cluster C k , choose a sequence A i : 
INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDY
The proposed method determining the causal alarm in alarm flood sequence is illustrated by an analysis conducted on the cracking and quenching section of an ethylene plant located in Austria.
The alarm management system of the plant has more than 3800 alarms configured in the monitoring system. The analysis is performed using eight months of collected alarm data, during which more than 48000 alarms occurred. The process data is presented in an excel file with a one-second IFAC DYCOPS-CAB, 2016 June 6-8, 2016 . NTNU, Trondheim, Norway sampling period data set. A CAEX file containing the topology model of the plant is used. The P&ID of the plant section is shown in Fig. 3 . The data are analyzed using a developed prototype software tool that guides the user through the steps of the proposed method. The parameters for the alarm analysis are set by the user. The threshold number of alarms (τ ) (see Section 2.2) is set to a value of six. Since operators of the ethylene plant control more than one area, the threshold number of alarms is set to a value smaller than 10 alarms per 10 min. Additionally, the value of 0.4 is chosen for the clustering threshold as well as for the prefiltering threshold (see Subsection 2.3). The parameter σ 2 from the MSW algorithm (Cheng et al., 2013 ) is set to 5000, allowing alarms with a time delay of around 3.5min to be matched. After loading the alarm log to the software tool and performing the steps Remove chattering alarms and Identify alarm flood periods, 23 alarm flood periods are identified. Results obtained from the Cluster alarm flood sequences step are depicted in Fig. 4 (a) . Three clusters are obtained. From the 23 alarm sequences analyzed, four do not belong to any cluster and 19 are clustered under one of the three groups. Each one of these clusters containing similar alarm flood sequences represents a different process abnormality. Only the process abnormality from Cluster1 is further analyzed. The template of this abnormality is displayed in Fig. 4 (b) .
To perform the data-driven and connectivity analysis, the signals and assets associated to the alarms included in the template are identified. After loading the process data and the topology model of the plant, the automatic mapping using the Smith-Waterman algorithm is performed. The results are displayed in Fig. 5 . Tags in red represent alarms, tags in blue signals and tags in green assets. For instance, the valve G02 has an associated signal G02.Y and two alarms G02/010 and G02/011.
The process signals appearing in the mapping tree of Fig. 5 are considered for the analysis. These signals are displayed in Fig. 6 . The results of the process-data analysis are shown in a bubble chart representing the transfer entropy based causality matrix (Bauer et al., 2007) . The analysis Finally, the result of the process-data analysis is validated using the process connectivity. The process connectivity analysis found feasible propagation paths starting from Fig. 8 . Propagation paths found by the connectivity analysis the suggested root-cause to all secondary disturbed points. Fig. 8 depicts the obtained propagation paths. The process connectivity analysis suggests that the abnormality spread from the pressure controller PC11 S to the valves G01 and G02 via the information connection between this controller and the valves. From valve G01, the disturbance spread to the pressure controller PC12 S. Simultaneously, the disturbance reached Cracking Zone A, Cracking Zone B, Cracking Zone C and Cracking Zone D via the heat exchangers LQE 1, LQE 2, LQE 3 and LQE 4. Sensors PI13 S, PI14 S, PI15 S and PI16 S were also affected by the propagating disturbance since they are located in the coils of the different cracking zones. The rootcause suggestion from the data-driven analysis is therefore validated by the plant connectivity analysis. An alarm associated to PC11 S is the given causal alarm suggestion, i.e. alarm PC11 CO 4. All the alarms in the template will be grouped under it.
After discussion with site engineers the obtained results were confirmed. The analysed abnormal situation corresponds to a shift in the operating mode between crackingdecoking. The transition between these two operating modes triggers a characteristic alarm flood sequence. The site crew mentioned that pressure controller PC11 is performing the opening and closing of both valve G01 and valve G02 during the change of operation mode and is therefore the origin of the alarm flood.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed an innovative way to reduce alarm flooding by using a combination of data from different information sources. Combining alarm log, historical process data and process connectivity analysis allowed to not only group consequence alarms, but also to determine the causal alarm of an alarm flood sequence. The proposed method was tested on actual data collected from an ethylene plant. The proposed approach was able to group related alarms triggered during an alarm flood and to identify their causal alarm.
